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Scroll down to read reviews of recent legislative activity and Supreme Court decisions in Alaska or jump to a recent update by clicking on the link:
- Amos v. Allstate Insurance
- House Bill 151 - codified as AS 36.90.300
- Villaflores v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
- Sidney v. Allstate
- State of Alaska v. Carpenter et al.
- Wilson v. MacDonald
- Previous Reviews
- Links to other sites containing recent Alaska law changes
- Amos et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al. – May 23, 2008: Jack and Joe Tatum were co-owners of a river boat involved in a collision. The Tatums’ boat was insured under a boat owner’s policy issued by Allstate to Joe Tatum and his wife Bertha.
In the year 2000, the Tatums’ annual premium of $289.00 was to be paid in six installments. When Allstate did not receive the payment that was due on June 6, Allstate mailed a notice to the Tatums on June 16 advising them that the policy would be cancelled for nonpayment unless payment in the minimum amount of $99.84 was received before July 15. On June 19, upon receiving a premium payment of $51.67, Allstate sent a notice to the Tatums acknowledging receipt of the payment and reiterating that the policy would still be cancelled on July 15 unless an additional $51.67 was received.
On August 9, the Tatums’ boat was involved in an accident with another boat driven by John Tice. Casey Amos was Tice’s passenger. On August 14, Bertha Tatum visited her insurance agent who advised her that the cost of reinstating the policy was $51.67. Tatum submitted a payment for that amount. In exchange, the insurance agent gave Tatum a document titled “Conditional Receipt.” The document provided that acceptance of the payment did not reinstate the policy or afford coverage for any accident which took place before issuance of the receipt, that a refund would be provided if coverage was not reinstated, and that notification would be provided if coverage was reinstated. Tatum did not mention the accident. On August 15, Allstate mailed the Tatums a reinstatement notice stating that the policy was cancelled effective July 15, 2000 and reinstated on August 15, 2000.
On September 6, Allstate received its first notice of the boat accident. On September 11, Allstate notified the Tatums that the policy was in cancellation status as of the date of the accident. On October 9, Allstate notified the Tatums that it would not pay claims arising out of the accident because the policy had been cancelled as of the August 9 accident.
Tice and Amos filed personal injury lawsuits against Jack Tatum. Tatum did not tender the defense of the suits to Allstate. Tatum then sued Allstate and Allstate’s claims professional alleging breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith. The trial court ruled that Allstate waived any claim that the premium was not paid on time because Allstate accepted the premium payment and the policy did not contain a provision allowing for a gap in coverage. The trial court found that the “Conditional Receipt” did not have any effect because case law indicated that the condition must be in the policy itself and because Allstate could not effectively amend the policy by accepting payment when no provision authorizing a lapse appeared in the policy.
On appeal, Allstate argued that the court erred in ruling that Allstate was precluded from reinstating the cancelled policy with a lapse in coverage. The supreme court agreed with Allstate. By statute, an insurer may cancel an insurance policy for nonpayment of premiums by mailing written notice of cancellation to the named insured at least 20 days before the effective date of cancellation. In addition, Allstate’s policy provided that the policy could be cancelled for nonpayment upon mailing notice of cancellation to the insured at least ten days before the date of cancellation. The supreme court found that the letters from Allstate of June 16 and June 19 complied with the method of cancellation set forth in AS 21.36.220(a)(1) and in the policy itself. In conclusion, the court held that there was no reason why the conditional receipt and reinstatement notice should not be enforced in accordance with their terms; therefore, there was no coverage for the August 9 accident under the policy.
The court addressed a variety of other issues and arguments which are not summarized here. Read the full Amos et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al. opinion on the Alaska Supreme Court website here.
- House Bill 151 - codified as AS 36.90.300: House Bill 151 requires that a construction-related professional services contract include a provision by which the consultant agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless a public agency from claims or liability for the negligent acts, errors, or omissions of the consultant. The statute also includes suggested contract language that is deemed to satisfy the requirement for such a provision. “Consultant” is defined as a person who contracts with a public agency to provide professional services, and includes the employees, agents, and contractors who are directly responsible to the consultant. “Professional services” encompasses professional, technical, or consultant’s services that are: (1) predominantly intellectual in character; (2) result in the production of a report or the completion of a task; and (3) include analysis, evaluation, prediction, planning, or recommendation. The new law goes into effect on May 26, 2008.
Read the full Bill on the Alaska State Legislature website here.
- Clarito Villaflores v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights – February 8, 2008: Clarito Villaflores, a forty-five year-old Asian male, applied for a job with Conoco Phillips as a North Slope human resources representative. The job application form did not ask applicants for their age, but permitted applicants to report their race on a voluntary basis. Villaflores did not provide his race on the application, but indicated that he had graduated from Silliman University in the Philippines and that he was proficient in Filipino. Conoco Phillips hired a different applicant for the position. Villaflores filed a complaint with the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights alleging age and race discrimination.
Conoco Phillips stated that it did not interview or hire Villaflores because he lacked the minimum qualifications for the job. The hired applicant had ten years of human resources and labor relations experience in the oil industry on the North Slope. Villaflores’ job application did not indicate any relevant human resources or labor relations experience.
The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights determined that Villaflores’ complaint was not supported by substantial evidence because Villaflores was not qualified for the position and the evidence did not support Villaflores’ allegation that he was not interviewed or hired by Conoco Phillips because of his age or race. When the Commission declined to reopen Villaflores’ complaint, Villaflores appealed to the superior court. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s decision, concluding that Villaflores failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. Villaflores appealed.
On appeal, the supreme court analyzed and applied AS 18.80.220(a)(1), the state anti-discrimination statute. In order to prove employment discrimination in a case in which there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the complaining party must establish that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applications; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the employer hired an individual who was not within the same protected class as he. The supreme court affirmed the decisions of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights and the superior court and held that because Villaflores could not satisfy the second element, he did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Read the full Villaflores v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights opinion in pdf format here.
- Joanne Sidney v. Allstate Insurance Company – January 11, 2008: Sidney was a passenger who was injured in an automobile accident. She settled for facial limits of the driver’s insurance policy with Safeco, without the additional add-ons of attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest, and costs. Sidney then pursued underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage with her own insurer, Allstate.
Following entry of an arbitration award in Sidney’s favor, Allstate paid the amount of the award less the $50,000 settlement with Safeco. Sidney filed a complaint with the superior court to confirm the arbitration award, but argued that Allstate was not entitled to the offset for the amount of the Safeco settlement. The superior court concluded that Allstate was entitled to the offset, but that Sidney was entitled to add-ons of prejudgment interest, costs and attorney’s fees on the full amount of the award.
On appeal, Sidney argued that under Coughlin v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), 69 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2003) and the Alaska UIM statutory framework, she was entitled to recover add-ons of attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest, and costs on the $50,000 settlement with Safeco from Allstate. The Alaska Supreme Court held that where a liability policy provides coverage for add-ons, the amounts payable may be greater than the policy’s limits of liability; thus, Sidney’s failure to directly dispute that add-ons were available to her under the Safeco policy, her election to forgo those amounts when she settled with Safeco, the plain language of the Allstate UIM policy, and the fact that Sidney was not “underinsured” with respect to the amount of the add-ons at issue supported the conclusion that Sidney was not entitled to recover add-ons on her Safeco liability settlement from Allstate.
The court addressed a variety of other issues and arguments which are not summarized here. Read the full Sidney v. Allstate opinion in pdf format here.
- State of Alaska v. Carpenter et al. - October 26, 2007: Karen Carpenter, a resident of Juneau, Alaska, wrote a letter to a local radio station complaining about the Tom Leykis Show, a national radio talk show. Leykis read the letter on the air and made derogatory remarks about Carpenter. The court found that Leykis’s comments were intended to encourage listeners to contact or confront Carpenter. Carpenter sued Leykis and his producer, Westwood One. Both parties appealed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of speech about public figures and matters of public concern. In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claimant must prove that there was extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress. The court found that heightened First Amendment protection for speech about public figures and matters of public concern does not altogether foreclose a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On remand, the court stated that the jury should consider whether defendant Leykis’s conduct, when viewed in its entirety, was extreme and outrageous, was intentional or reckless, and caused plaintiff Carpenter severe emotional distress.
In addition, the court found that it was not error for the trial court to submit Carpenter’s spoliation claim to the jury. Carpenter argued that defendant Westwood One, Leykis’s producer, committed spoliation of evidence by destroying the tape of Leykis’s radio show that was the subject of the litigation. The court held that because Carpenter’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was viable, and because a reasonable jury could find that Westwood One spoiled the tape with the intent to disrupt the underlying litigation, Westwood One was not entitled to a directed verdict on the spoliation claim.
Finally, the court upheld the constitutionality of Alaska Statute 09.17.020(j), which requires the court to deposit fifty percent of a punitive damages award into the state’s general fund. Citing its decision in Anderson v. State ex rel. Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n (Anderson II), 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 2003), the court confirmed that the statute mandates that the superior court deduct a pro rata share of the plaintiff’s attorney’s contingent fee from the state’s portion of the punitive damages award.
The court addressed a variety of other issues and arguments which are not summarized here. Due to the size of the opinion (83 pages) we are unable to upload it to our website. Please visit Westlaw's Alaska Case Law Service and enter the parties or the citation number (171 P.3d 41) in the search terms to vew the full opinion.
- Wilson v. MacDonald - October 19, 2007: Merle Wilson pled no contest to a criminal assault charge. Following resolution of the criminal case, the victim, Judy MacDonald, sued Wilson in a civil action for damages related to the assault. The superior court granted summary judgment against Wilson on the elements of assault and held that a defendant who pleads no contest in a criminal case is estopped from relitigating the elements of the offense in a subsequent civil case. Wilson appealed the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to MacDonald.
Referencing its decision in Lamb v. Anderson, 147 P.3d 736, 742 (Alaska 2006), the Court explained that if a trial court accepts a no contest plea, the record should establish that the defendant understands that the plea will result in a conviction, and that the conviction can be used in future cases to establish that the defendant engaged in the conduct involved in the offense. Furthermore, the validity of a plea cannot be challenged in the context of a subsequent civil suit. Rather, the validity of the plea itself should be resolved through a motion for post-conviction relief or appeal in the criminal case.
In conclusion, the Court held that as long as Wilson’s no contest plea stands, he is collaterally estopped from relitigating any elements of assault in the civil case. Read the full Wilson v. MacDonald et al. opinion in pdf format here.
- Previous case reviews:
Click the following links for reviews of earlier cases and law changes:
Kenai Chrysler Center, Inc. v Denison - 2007
Pagenkopf v Chatham Electric, Inc. - 2007
Diggens v Jackson - 2007
Sands v Green - 2007
Other links to recent law changes:
Recent case decisions are in PDF format.
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